December 14, 2024

U.S. Department of State 2023

Country Reports on Terrorism 2023
The Bureau of Counterterrorism

In 2023, Iran remained the leading state sponsor of terrorism, facilitating a wide range of terrorist and other illicit activities in the United States and globally. Regionally, Iran continued supporting acts of terrorism through its proxies and partner groups – such as Hizballah, Ansar Allah (commonly referred to as the Houthis), Hamas, and al-Ashtar Brigades – in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen. In the last months of 2023, Houthi militants in Yemen engaged in numerous attacks on shipping lanes in the Red Sea, significantly disrupting maritime commerce and global trade. Separately, Iranian-aligned militia groups (IAMG) in Iraq and Syria conducted repeated attacks with unmanned aircraft systems against U.S. forces in the region in attempts to compel their withdrawal. Globally, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security remained Iran’s primary actors involved in supporting terrorist recruitment, financing, and plotting across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas.

State Sponsors of Terrorism

Iran

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its support for terrorist activity in 2023, including support for Hizballah, U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups in the West Bank and Gaza including Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iran-aligned militia groups (IAMGs) in Iraq and Syria. After the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel, Iran-backed groups took advantage of the regional conflict to further their objectives. Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to provide support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert operations, and create instability in the region. The IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad. In 2019 the Secretary of State designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including IRGC-QF, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Iran uses regional militant and proxy groups to facilitate deniability and to shield it from accountability for its destabilizing policies.

In 2023, Iran continued providing weapons systems and other support to Hamas and other U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Although there is no evidence that Iran knew about Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel in advance, its long-standing material, financial, and training support to Hamas enabled Hamas to execute the attack.

In Iraq and Syria, Iran supported various IAMGs in 2023, including the U.S.-designated terrorist groups Kata’ib Hizballah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, with sophisticated weapons – including increasingly accurate and lethal unmanned aerial systems (UAS) – support, funding, and training. On October 18, IAMGs restarted attacks against US military and diplomatic facilities, which came after an 18-month general pause in attacks in Iraq and a six-month pause in attacks in Syria. By the end of 2023, IAMGs had attacked US facilities in Iraq and Syria more than 100 times.

Iran also bolstered terrorist groups operating in Syria, including Hizballah, which has provided significant support to the Assad regime. Iran views the Assad regime as a crucial ally. The Iranian government used Iraq and Syria for transshipment of weapons to Hizballah. Iranian forces have backed militia operations in Syria and Iraq directly, with artillery, rockets, drones, and armored vehicles. Through financial or residency enticements, Iran has facilitated and coerced primarily Shia fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan to participate in the Assad regime’s brutal actions in Syria. These Iran-aligned forces conducted multiple attacks on U.S. forces in Syria.

Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. Israeli security officials and politicians expressed concerns that Iran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, as well as assisting the group in creating infrastructure that would permit it to produce its own rockets and missiles, thereby threatening Israel from Lebanon and Syria. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. Hizballah fighters have been used extensively in Syria to support the Assad regime.

In Bahrain, Iran has continued to provide weapons, support, and training to local Shia militant groups, including the al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar, both U.S.-designated terrorist groups.

In Yemen, Iran has provided a wide range of weapons, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAS) and missiles, training, and other support to Houthi militants, who in late 2023 began attacking Israel and commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden with missiles, UAS, and small boats. The Houthis seized the commercial vessel Galaxy Leader and continued to hold its crew hostage.

In 2023, Iranian forces continued a pattern of attacks on commercial ships in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, including a December 23 drone attack on the Chem Pluto, a Liberian-flagged tanker carrying oil. Additionally, in 2023, Iran seized commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters.

As in past years, the Iranian government continued supporting terrorist plots or associated activities targeting dissidents and other perceived enemies of the regime. In 2023 the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed an indictment charging three individuals connected with Iran in a plot to assassinate an Iranian dissident in New York City. Also in 2023, a United Kingdom court found a man guilty of attempting to collect information for terrorist purposes on the London-based Iran International, a media company that is critical of the Iranian regime. In recent years, Albania, Belgium, and the Netherlands have all either arrested, convicted, or expelled Iranian government officials implicated in various terrorist plots in their respective territories. Denmark similarly recalled its ambassador from Tehran after learning of an Iran-backed plot to kill an Iranian dissident in that country.

In an extension from 2022, the Albanian government in 2023 continued to be a victim of cyberattacks emanating from Iran, likely in response to Albania hosting members of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq – an Iranian dissident group that advocates overthrowing the Iranian government. Additionally, Iran pursued or supported terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in 2023, including a thwarted plot to attack Israeli tourists in Cyprus. These plots were being implemented by current and former members of the IRGC-QF.

Senior al-Qa’ida members continued to reside in Iran, where the authorities still refuse to identify publicly members they know to be living in the country. Iran has allowed al-Qa’ida facilitators to operate a core transit pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling al-Qa’ida to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria, among other locales.

at

December 07, 2024

U.S. Director of National Intelligence 2024

Iran's Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022

Assessment Regarding the Regional and Global Terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran'

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
November 2024

at

July 30, 2024

U.S. Director of National Intelligence 2024

Iran's Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022

Assessment Regarding the Regional and Global Terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
July 2024

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2024/3971-iran-s-nuclear-weapons-capability-and-terrorism-monitoring-act-of-2022-assessment-regarding-the-regional-and-global-terrorism-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran

https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ODNI-Unclassified-Assessment-Regarding-the-Regional-and-Global-Terrorism-of-the-Islamic-Republic-of-Iran-202407.pdf

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PVRuYc0RC-KmVJvA-gXYdWmst8_0po9q/view?usp=sharing

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March 13, 2024

U.S. Intelligence Community 2024

Worldwide Threat Assessment
Annual Threat Assessment

Director of National Intelligence

Selected extracts

Iran
 
Regional and Global Activities

Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, and influence in the Middle East and intends to entrench its emergent status as a regional power while minimizing threats to the regime and the risk of direct military conflict. Tehran will try to leverage recent military successes through its emboldened threat network, diplomatic gains, its expanded nuclear program, and its military sales to advance its ambitions, including by trying to further bolster ties with Moscow. Iran will seek to use the Gaza conflict to denounce Israel, decry its role in the region, and try to dissuade other Middle Eastern states from warming ties with Israel, while trumpeting Iran’s own role as the champion of the Palestinian cause. However, Iran’s position on the conflict is unlikely to mask the challenges that it faces internally, where economic underperformance and societal grievances still test the regime.

• Decades of cultivating ties, providing support, funding, weapons, and training to its partners and proxies around the Middle East, including Lebanese Hizballah, the Huthis, and Iranianbacked militias in Iraq and Syria, will enable Tehran to continue to demonstrate the efficacy of leveraging these members of the “Axis of Resistance”, a loose consortium of like minded terrorist and militant actors. Tehran was able to flex the network’s military capabilities in the aftermath of HAMAS’ attack on 7 October, orchestrating anti-Israel and anti-U.S. attacks from Lebanon to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait while shielding Iranian leaders from significant consequences.

• During 2023, Iran expanded its diplomatic influence through improved ties with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Iran stipulated a readiness to re-implement the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to gain sanctions relief, but Tehran’s continued support to terrorist proxies and threats to former U.S. officials have not favored a deal.

• The economic, political, and societal seeds of popular discontent are still present in Iran and could threaten further domestic strife such as was seen in the wide-scale and prolonged protests inside of Iran during late 2022 and early 2023.

• Iran also will continue to directly threaten U.S. persons in the Middle East and remains committed to its decade-long effort to develop surrogate networks inside the United States. Iran seeks to target former and current U.S. officials as retaliation for the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, and previously has attempted to conduct lethal operations in the United States.

• The conflict in Gaza and Iran’s support to HAMAS could further weaken Iran’s attempts to improve its international stature and entice foreign investment. 
Iran will remain a threat to Israel and U.S. allies and interests in the region well after the Gaza conflict, and probably will continue arming and aiding its allies to threaten the United States as well as backing HAMAS and others who seek to block a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. While Iran will remain careful to avoid a direct conflict with either Israel or the United States, it nonetheless enabled scores of militia rocket, missile, and UAV attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria; Hizballah exchanges of fire with Israel on the north border with Lebanon; and Huthi missile and  UAV attacks, both on Israel directly and on international commercial shipping transiting the Red Sea.

WMD

Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device. Since 2020, however, Tehran has stated that it is no longer constrained by any JCPOA limits, and Iran has greatly expanded its nuclear program, reduced IAEA monitoring, and undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.

• Iran uses its nuclear program to build negotiating leverage and respond to perceived international pressure. Tehran said it would restore JCPOA limits if the United States fulfilled its JCPOA commitments and the IAEA closed its outstanding safeguards investigations. Tehran down blended a small quantity of 60 percent enriched uranium and significantly lowered its rate of production from June to November 2023.

• Iran continues to increase the size and enrichment level of its uranium stockpile, and develop, manufacture, and operate advanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, if it chooses to do so.

• Iran probably will consider installing more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its enriched uranium stockpile, or enriching uranium up to 90 percent in response to additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program. 
Iran probably aims to continue research and development of chemical and biological agents for offensive purposes. Iranian military scientists have researched chemicals, toxins, and bioregulators, all of which have a wide range of sedation, dissociation, and amnestic incapacitating effects.

Military

Iran’s hybrid approach to warfare—using both conventional and unconventional capabilities will pose a threat to U.S. interests in the region for the foreseeable future. Iran’s unconventional warfare operations and network of militant partners and proxies enable Tehran to pursue its interests and maintain strategic depth with a modicum of deniability.

• Iran has started taking delivery of advanced trainer aircraft and probably will seek to acquire new conventional weapon systems, such as advanced fighter aircraft, helicopters, and main battle tanks. However, budgetary constraints will slow the pace and scale of acquisitions.

• Iran’s missile, UAV, air defense, and naval capabilities will continue to threaten U.S. and partner commercial and military assets in the Middle East. Iran’s ballistic missile programs have the largest inventory in the region and Tehran is emphasizing improving the accuracy, lethality, and reliability of its missiles. Meanwhile, Iran’s work on space launch vehicles (SLVs —including its Simorgh—would shorten the timeline to produce an ICBM, if it decided to develop one, because the systems use similar technologies.

Cyber and Malign Influence Operations

Iran’s growing expertise and willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations make it a major threat to the security of U.S. and allied and partner networks and data. Tehran’s opportunistic approach to cyber attacks puts U.S. infrastructure at risk for being targeted, particularly as its previous attacks against Israeli targets show that Iran is willing to target countries with stronger cyber capabilities than itself. Iran will continue to conduct malign influence operations in the Middle East and in other regions, including trying to undermine U.S. political processes and amplify discord.
Ahead of the U.S. election in 2024, Iran may attempt to conduct influence operations aimed at U.S. interests, including targeting U.S. elections, having demonstrated a willingness and capability to do so in the past.

• During the U.S. election cycle in 2020, Iranian cyber actors obtained or attempted to obtain U.S. voter information, sent threatening emails to voters, and disseminated disinformation about the election. The same Iranian actors have evolved their activities and developed a new set of techniques, combining cyber and influence capabilities, that Iran could deploy during the U.S. election cycle in 2024.

Challenges

Despite weathering protests in late 2022 and early 2023, Iran continues to face domestic challenges that constrain the regime’s ability to achieve its goals. Mismanagement and international sanctions are brakes on the economy that limit the regime’s ability to buy domestic support and legitimacy.

• Iran’s economy continues to struggle amidst high inflation—likely to top 40 percent for 2023, sanctions pressure, and a depreciating currency. Most wages are unable to keep pace with the higher prices, leading to declines in households’ spending power. During the coming years, Iran also will be increasingly challenged by climate change as water becomes scarcer.

• Iran’s dependency on oil export revenues and slowing economic growth in China—Iran’s largest buyer of oil—portend weaker revenues for Tehran and potentially higher budget deficits, probably forcing lower government spending on infrastructure, including for power and water.

• Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has been serving in the position since 1989 and is in his mid-80s. His eventual passing could challenge a system characterized by elite factionalism that has only undergone a single supreme leader transition.

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December 02, 2023

U.S. Department of State 2022

Country Reports on Terrorism 2022
The Bureau of Counterterrorism

https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/



Extract

Forward

Iran continued to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, facilitating a wide range of terrorist and other illicit activities around the world. In 2022, Iran increasingly encouraged and plotted attacks against the United States, including against former U.S. officials, in retaliation for the death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani. In August an Iran-based IRGC member was charged with attempting to arrange the murder of a former U.S. National Security Advisor. Regionally, Iran supported acts of terrorism in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen through proxies and partner groups such as Hizballah and al-Ashtar Brigades. Globally, the IRGC-QF and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security remained Iran’s primary actors involved in supporting terrorist recruitment, financing, and plotting across Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and South America.

State Sponsors of Terrorism

Iran

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its support for terrorist activity in 2022, including support for Hizballah, U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups in the West Bank and Gaza, and various terrorist and militant groups in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and throughout the Middle East. Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to provide support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert operations, and create instability in the region. Iran has acknowledged the involvement of the IRGC-QF in the Iraq and Syria conflicts, and the IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad. In 2019 the Secretary of State designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including IRGC-QF, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Iran also used regional militant and proxy groups to provide deniability, in an attempt to shield it from accountability for its destabilizing policies.

In Iraq, Iran supported various Iran-aligned militia groups in 2022, including the U.S.-designated terrorist groups Kata’ib Hizballah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, with sophisticated weapons - including increasingly accurate and lethal unmanned aerial systems (UAS) - support, funding, and training. These groups conducted multiple rocket and UAS attacks on U.S. and coalition facilities across Iraq, as well as attacks in Syria from Iraq in 2022. These included multiple attacks on U.S. and coalition forces at Ain al-Assad Airbase in January and May. Additionally, Iran-aligned militia groups conducted an explosive UAS attack on Erbil in June, which injured three civilians, and two drone attacks on Turkish bases in Iraq in July. Pro-Iranian militias also fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul in July.

Iran also bolstered terrorist groups operating in Syria, including Hizballah, which has provided significant support to the Assad regime. Iran views the Assad regime as a crucial ally. It considers Iraq and Syria vital routes through which it can supply weapons to Hizballah, Iran’s primary terrorist proxy group. Iranian forces have directly backed militia operations in Syria with artillery, rockets, drones, and armored vehicles. Through financial or residency enticements, Iran has facilitated and coerced primarily Shia fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan to participate in the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown in Syria. These Iran-aligned forces conducted multiple attacks on U.S. forces in Syria.

Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. Israeli security officials and politicians expressed concerns that Iran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, as well as assisting the group in creating infrastructure that would permit it to produce its own rockets and missiles, thereby threatening Israel from Lebanon and Syria. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. Hizballah fighters have been used extensively in Syria to support the Assad regime.

In 2022, Iran continued providing weapons systems and other support to Hamas and other U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. These groups were behind numerous deadly attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank.

In Bahrain, Iran has continued to provide weapons, support, and training to local Shia militant groups, including the al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar, both U.S.-designated terrorist groups.

In Yemen, Iran has provided a wide range of weapons, training, advanced equipment such as UAS, and other support to Houthi militants, who engaged in attacks against regional targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On at least five occasions in 2022, the U.S. Navy and partner forces interdicted vessels suspected of traveling from Iran to Yemen, with cargoes that included more than 300 tons of missile fuel component and fertilizer that could be used by Houthi militants to make missiles and explosives, as well as ammunition, small arms, and equipment.

In 2022, Iranian forces continued a pattern of attacks on commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman, including a November 16 drone attack on the Pacific Zircon, a Liberian-flagged, Israeli-affiliated tanker carrying oil.

Iran pursued or supported terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in 2022, including thwarted plots to attack Israeli tourists in Türkiye in May and to murder an Israeli citizen in Georgia in November. These plots were being implemented by current and former members of the IRGC-QF.

Senior al-Qa’ida members continued to reside in Iran, where the authorities still refuse to identify publicly members they know to be living in the country. Iran has allowed AQ facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria, among other locales.

As in past years, the Iranian government continued supporting terrorist plots or associated activities targeting dissidents and other perceived enemies of the regime. A British intelligence agency publicly reported uncovering at least 10 potential threats emanating from Iran’s government to kidnap or kill individuals in the United Kingdom in 2022. In recent years, Albania, Belgium, and the Netherlands have all either arrested or expelled Iranian government officials implicated in various terrorist plots in their respective territories. Denmark similarly recalled its ambassador from Tehran after learning of an Iran-backed plot to kill an Iranian dissident in its country. The Albanian government became a victim of cyberattacks emanating from Iran in July and September, likely in response to Albania providing shelter to the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq - an Iranian dissident group that advocates overthrowing the government in Iran. In 2022 the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it had disrupted an IRGC-QF-led plot to assassinate former National Security Advisor John Bolton and arrested a suspected Iranian operative accused of planning the assassination.

at

June 30, 2023

U.S. Director of National Intelligence 2023

Iran's Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
June 2023

at

May 25, 2023

U.S. Department of State 2021

Foreword

Iran continued to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, facilitating a wide range of terrorist and other illicit activities around the world. Regionally, Iran supported acts of terrorism in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen through proxies and partner groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. Additionally, senior AQ leaders continued to reside in Iran and engaged with other AQ elements from the country. Globally, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security remained Iran’s primary actor involved in supporting terrorist recruitment, financing, and plots across Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and South America. Iran also maintained a near-global procurement network, obtaining cutting-edge technology from companies and locales around the world to bolster its terrorist and military capabilities.

State Sponsors of Terrorism

Iran

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its support for terrorist-related activity in 2021, including support for Hizballah, Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, and various terrorist and militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere throughout the Middle East. Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to provide support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert operations, and create instability in the region. Iran has acknowledged the involvement of the IRGC-QF in the Iraq and Syria conflicts, and the IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad. In 2019, the Secretary of State designated the IRGC, including IRGC-QF, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Iran also used regional militant and proxy groups to provide deniability, in an attempt to shield it from accountability for its destabilizing policies.

In Iraq, Iran supported various Iran-aligned militia groups in 2021, including the U.S.-designated terrorist groups Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, with sophisticated weapons - including increasingly accurate and lethal unmanned aerial systems (UAS) - support, funding, and training. These groups conducted roughly two dozen rocket and UAS attacks on U.S. and coalition facilities across Iraq in 2021. These included rocket attacks on U.S. Embassy Baghdad on January 22 and July 8; explosive UAS attacks on U.S. facilities in Erbil on February 15, April 14, and July 6; and multiple attacks in June on U.S. and coalition forces at Ain Al-Assad Airbase. Additionally, Iran-aligned militia groups conducted an explosive UAS attack on PM Kadhimi’s residence on November 6.

Iran also bolstered terrorist groups operating in Syria, including Hizballah, which has provided significant support to the Assad regime. Iran views the Assad regime in Syria as a crucial ally and Iraq and Syria as vital routes through which to supply weapons to Hizballah, Iran’s primary terrorist proxy group. Iranian forces have directly backed militia operations in Syria with artillery, rockets, drones, and armored vehicles. Through financial or residency enticements, Iran has facilitated and coerced primarily Shia fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan to participate in the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown in Syria. These Iran-aligned forces conducted an attack on U.S. forces at Al-Tanf, Syria, on October 20.

Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. Israeli security officials and politicians expressed concerns that Iran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, as well as assisting the group in creating infrastructure that would permit it to indigenously produce rockets and missiles to threaten Israel from Lebanon and Syria. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. Hizballah fighters have been used extensively in Syria to support the Assad regime.

In 2021, Iran continued providing weapons systems and other support to Hamas and other U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. These groups were behind numerous deadly attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank.

In Bahrain, Iran has continued to provide weapons, support, and training to local Shia militant groups, including the al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar, both U.S.-designated terrorist groups.

In Yemen, Iran has provided a wide range of weapons, training, advanced equipment such as unmanned aerial systems, and other support to Houthi militants, who engaged in hundreds of attacks against regional targets in Saudi Arabia. In May and December, the U.S. Navy and partner forces interdicted dhows carrying Iran-origin weapons intended for the Houthis, including hundreds of heavy machine guns and sniper rifles; dozens of advanced, Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles; several hundred rocket-propelled grenade launchers and optical sights for weapons; and thousands of assault rifles.

In 2021, Iranian forces attacked several commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman, including an April 13 attack on the Hyperion Ray and a July 29 UAS attack on the Mercer Street vessel.

Iran pursued or supported terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in 2021, including a thwarted January plot to attack an Israeli embassy in East Africa, a January bomb attack outside the Israeli embassy in New Delhi for which the Indian government said the IRGC-QF was responsible, and a disrupted attempt to attack an Israeli businessman in Cyprus in October.

Senior al-Qa’ida (AQ) members continued to reside in the country, and Iran has refused to publicly identify members it knows to be living in Iran. Iran has allowed AQ facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria, among other locales.

As in past years, the Iranian government continued supporting terrorist plots or associated activities targeting Iranian dissidents. In recent years, Albania, Belgium, and the Netherlands have all either arrested or expelled Iranian government officials implicated in various terrorist plots in their respective territories. Denmark similarly recalled its ambassador from Tehran after learning of an Iran-backed plot to kill an Iranian dissident in Denmark. In 2021, the United States disrupted an Iranian intelligence network plot to kidnap Masih Alinejad, an Iranian American journalist and human rights advocate living in Brooklyn, New York, from within the United States. The plot entailed luring Alinejad to a third country to capture her and forcibly render her to Iran. An Iranian plot to kidnap an Iranian helicopter pilot from Türkiye was also reportedly foiled by Turkish authorities.

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March 01, 2023

U.S. Intelligence Community 2023

Worldwide Threat Assessment
Annual Threat Assessment

Director of National Intelligence

Selected extracts 

Iran

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle 
East, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states, and minimize threats to the regime. Tehran will try to leverage diplomacy, its expanding nuclear program, its conventional, proxy, and partner forces, and its military sales and acquisitions to advance its goals. The Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle with the United States and its regional allies, while it pursues its longstanding ambitions for regional leadership.

• The regime engaged in detailed talks throughout last year toward the renewal of the 2015 JointComprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but Iran’s hardline officials’ distrust of Washington and doubts that the United States would deliver or sustain any benefits of a renewed JCPOA have stood in the way of finalizing a deal. In addition, Iran has demanded resolution of the “Safeguards” issue, which concerns unexplained nuclear activity at several additional Iranian sites, as a primary condition for renewing the nuclear agreement.

• In late 2022 and early 2023, the Iranian regime faced some of the most widespread and prolonged protests since the 1979 revolution. These protests were sparked by a cultural issue—rather than an economic or political one—but have since grown to encompass overall grievances with the Islamic Republic and have included a wide swath of society.

• Iranian officials are concerned about the protracted protests and perceive that foreign meddling is prolonging the unrest.

• Even if Iran has contained this round of protests through violence and intimidation, compounding crises in the coming year probably will further challenge the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. With Iran’s depreciating currency and annual inflation rates of almost 50 percent in late 2022, Tehran probably faces an economic downturn that the IC assesses could prolong or reignite unrest and result in greater instability.

Iran will continue to threaten U.S. persons directly and via proxy attacks, particularly in the Middle East. Iran also remains committed to developing surrogate networks inside the United States, an objective it has pursued for more than a decade. Iranian-supported proxies will seek to launch attacks against U.S. forces and persons in Iraq and Syria, and perhaps in other countries and regions. Iran has threatened to target former and current U.S. officials as retaliation for the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, and has previously attempted to conduct lethal operations in the United States.

Iran remains a threat to Israel, both directly through its missile and UAV forces and indirectly through its support of Lebanese Hizballah, and other partners and proxies.

Iran will remain a source of instability across the region with its backing of Iraqi Shia militias, which pose the primary threat to U.S. personnel in Iraq. Iran’s economic and military backing for the regime of Bashar alAsad in Syria and support to the Huthis in Yemen—including provision of a range of advanced military systems—pose a threat to U.S. partners and interests, including Saudi Arabia.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Iran’s hybrid approach to warfare—using both conventional and unconventional capabilities—will pose a threat to U.S. interests in the region for the foreseeable future. The IRGC will remain central to Iran’s military power.

• Iran probably will seek to acquire new conventional weapon systems, such as advanced fighter aircraft, trainer aircraft, helicopters, air defense systems, para-naval patrol ships, and main battle tanks.
However, budgetary constraints and fiscal shortfalls will slow the pace and breadth of acquiring these systems.

• Iran's missile, UAV, and naval capabilities will continue to threaten U.S. and partner commercial and military assets in the Middle East.

• Iran’s unconventional warfare operations and network of militant partners and proxies enable Tehran to try to advance its interests in the region and maintain strategic depth.

Iran’s ballistic missile programs, which already include the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, continue to pose a threat to countries across the Middle East. Iran has emphasized improving the accuracy, lethality, and reliability of its missiles. Iran’s work on space launch vehicles (SLVs)—including its Simorgh—shortens the timeline to an ICBM if it decided to develop one because SLVs and ICBMs use similar technologies.

NUCLEAR ISSUES

Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities that would be necessary to produce a testable nuclear device. Since the assassination in November 2020 of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran has accelerated the expansion of its nuclear program, stated that it is no longer constrained by any JCPOA limits, and undertaken research and development activities that would bring it closer to producing the fissile material for completing a nuclear device following a decision to do so. If Tehran does not receive sanctions relief, Iranian officials probably will consider further enriching uranium up to 90 percent.

• Iran consistently has cast its resumption of nuclear activities that exceed JCPOA limits as a reversible response to the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement. Iran continues to message that it would return to full compliance if the United States provided sanctions relief and fulfilled its JCPOA commitments, and if the IAEA closed its safeguards investigations related to three undeclared nuclear sites.

• In 2021, the IAEA verified that Iran conducted research on uranium metal production and has produced small quantities of uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent. While Iran made this enriched uranium metal as part of its research and development for a new type of reactor fuel, the production of uranium metal was prohibited under the JCPOA as a key capability needed to produce nuclear weapons.

• Iran continues to increase the size and enrichment level of its uranium stockpile beyond JCPOA limits. Iran continues to exceed JCPOA restrictions on advanced centrifuge research and development, and continues uranium enrichment operations at the deeply buried Fordow facility, which was prohibited under the JCPOA. Iran has been enriching and accumulating uranium hexafluoride (UF6) up to 60 percent U-235 since April 2021, and continues to accumulate UF6 enriched up to 20 percent.

• Tehran has taken steps to put diplomatic pressure on the United States and other JCPOA signatories, and to try to build negotiating leverage.

CYBER AND MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

Iran’s growing expertise and willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations make it a major threat to the security of U.S. and allied networks and data. Iran’s opportunistic approach to cyber attacks makes critical infrastructure owners in the United States susceptible to being targeted by Tehran, particularly when Tehran believes that it must demonstrate it can push back against the United States in other domains. Recent attacks against Israeli targets show that Iran is more willing than before to target countries with stronger capabilities.

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February 16, 2023

Iran Continues To Offer Safe Haven To Al-Qaeda, US Confirms

Iran International
February 27, 2024

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US says Iran-based Egyptian Said al-Adel is new head of al-Qaeda

Al Arabiya
AFP
February 16, 2023

https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/02/16/US-says-Iran-based-Egyptian-Said-al-Adel-is-new-head-of-al-Qaeda

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US Confirms That Al Qaeda Top Man Is In Iran

Iran International
February 16, 2023

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US Backs UN Assessment that New Al-Qaida Leader is in Iran

VOA News
February 16, 2023

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-backs-un-assessment-that-new-al-qaida-leader-is-in-iran/6965397.html#:~:text=A%20new%20U.N.%20report%20says,leader%22%20of%20al%2DQaida.&text=The%20United%20States%20said%20Wednesday,Adel%2C%20is%20based%20in%20Iran.

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Al Qaeda's new leader Adel has $10 million bounty on his head

By Michael Georgy
Reuters
February 16, 2023

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/al-qaedas-new-leader-adel-has-10-million-bounty-his-head-2023-02-15/

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New Al-Qaida Leader Commanding from Iran

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Thirty-first report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities

Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
United Nations
February 13, 2023


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October 01, 2022

U.S. Intelligence Community 2022

Worldwide Threat Assessment
Annual Threat Assessment

Director of National Intelligence




Selected extracts

Iran

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states, and minimize threats to regime stability. Tehran will try to leverage its expanding nuclear program, proxy and partner forces, diplomacy, and military sales and acquisitions to advance its goals. The Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle with the United States and its regional allies, while it pursues its longstanding ambitions for regional leadership.

The election of President Ebrahim Raisi in 2021 has invigorated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to try to make progress toward his long-term vision of molding Iran into a pan Islamic power capable of defending global Muslim causes while tightening its theocratic rule at home.

• The regime is reluctant to directly engage diplomatically with the United States on a renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), even though it still aspires to secure sanctions relief. Iran’s hardline officials deeply distrust Washington and do not believe the United States can deliver or sustain any benefits a renewed JCPOA might offer.

We assess that Iran will threaten U.S. persons directly and via proxy attacks, particularly in the Middle East. Iran also remains committed to developing networks inside the United State —an objective it has pursued for more than a decade. Iranian-supported proxies will launch attacks against U.S. forces and persons in Iraq and Syria, and perhaps on other countries and regions. Iran has threatened to retaliate against former and current U.S. officials for the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, and has previously attempted to conduct lethal operations in the United States.

• Iran remains a threat to Israel, both directly through its missile forces and indirectly through its support of Lebanese Hizballah and other terrorist groups.

• Iran will remain a problematic actor across the region with its backing of Iraqi Shia militias, which is the primary threat to U.S. personnel in Iraq. Iran’s economically and militarily propping up of a rogue Syrian regime, and spreading instability across Yemen through its support to the Huthis—including a range of advanced military systems—also pose a threat to U.S. partners and interests, including Saudi Arabia.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Iran’s hybrid approach to warfare—using both conventional and unconventional capabilities will pose a threat to U.S. interests in the region for the foreseeable future. The IRGC-QF and its proxies will remain central to Iran’s military power.

• Despite Iran’s economic challenges, Tehran will seek to improve and acquire new conventional weaponry.

• Iran’s unconventional warfare operations and network of militant partners and proxies enable Tehran to advance its interests in the region and maintain strategic depth.

Iran’s ballistic missile programs, which include the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, continue to pose a threat to countries across the Middle East. Iran’s work on a space launch vehicle (SLV)—including its Simorgh—shortens the timeline to an ICBM because SLVs and ICBMs use similar technologies, if it decided to develop one.

NUCLEAR ISSUES

We continue to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities that we judge would be necessary to produce a nuclear device. In July 2019, following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, Iran began resuming some activities that exceed JCPOA limits. If Tehran does not receive sanctions relief, Iranian officials probably will consider further enriching uranium up to 90 percent.

• Iran has consistently cast its resumption of nuclear activities as a reversible response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and messaged that it would return to full compliance if the United States lifted sanctions and also fulfilled its JCPOA commitments.

• Iran continues to increase the size and enrichment level of its uranium stockpile beyond JCPOA limits. Iran continues to ignore restrictions on advanced centrifuge research and development and continues uranium enrichment operations at the deeply buried Fordow facility. Iran has been enriching uranium hexafluoride (UF6) up to 60 percent U-235 since April 2021, and continues to accumulate UF6 enriched up to 20 percent. The IAEA has verified that Iran is conducting uranium metal research and development, including producing laboratory scale quantities of uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent U-235.

CYBER AND MALIGN INFLUENCE

Iran’s growing expertise and willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations make it a major threat to the security of U.S. and allied networks and data. Iran’s opportunistic approach to cyber attacks makes critical infrastructure owners in the United States susceptible to being targeted by Tehran, especially when Tehran believes it must demonstrate that it can push back against the United States in other domains. Recent attacks on Israeli and U.S. targets show that Iran is more willing than before to target countries with stronger capabilities.

• Iran was responsible for multiple cyber attacks between April and July 2020 against Israeli water facilities. Iran’s successful disruption of critical infrastructure in Israel—also a superior cyber power compared with Iran—reflects its growing willingness to take risks when it believes retaliation is justified.

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U.S. Intelligence Community 2021

Worldwide Threat Assessment
Annual Threat Assessment

Director of National Intelligence




Selected extracts

Iran

IRANIAN PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS

Iran will present a continuing threat to US and allied interests in the region as it tries to erode US influence and support Shia populations abroad, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states, deflect international pressure, and minimize threats to regime stability. Although Iran’s deteriorating economy and poor regional reputation present obstacles to its goals, Tehran will try a range of tools—diplomacy, expanding its nuclear program, military sales and acquisitions, and proxy and partner attacks—to advance its goals. We expect that Iran will take risks that could escalate tensions and threaten US and allied interests in the coming year.

• Iran sees itself as locked in a struggle with the United States and its regional allies, whom they perceive to be focused on curtailing Iran’s geopolitical influence and pursuing regime change.

• Tehran’s actions will reflect its perceptions of US, Israeli, and Gulf state hostility; its ability to project force through conventional arms and proxy forces; and its desire to extract diplomatic and economic concessions from the international community.

• With regards to US interests in particular, Iran’s willingness to conduct attacks probably will hinge on its perception of the United States’ willingness to respond, its ability to conduct attacks without triggering direct conflict, and the prospect of jeopardizing potential US sanctions relief.

• Regime leaders probably will be reluctant to engage diplomatically in talks with the United States in the near term without sanctions or humanitarian relief or the United States rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran remains committed to countering US pressure, although Tehran is also wary of becoming involved in a full-blown conflict.

Regional Involvement and Destabilizing Activities

Iran will remain a problematic actor in Iraq, which will be the key battleground for Iran’s influence this year and during the next several years, and Iranian-supported Iraqi Shia militias will continue to pose the primary threat to US personnel in Iraq.

• The rise in indirect-fire and other attacks against US installations or US-associated convoys in Iraq in 2020 is largely attributed to Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militias.

• Iran will rely on its Shia militia allies and their associated political parties to work toward Iran’s goals of challenging the US presence and maintaining influence in Iraqi political and security issues. Tehran continues to leverage ties to Iraqi Shia groups and leaders to circumvent US sanctions and try to force the United States to withdraw through political pressure and kinetic strikes.

• Although Tehran remains an influential external actor in Iraq, Iraqi politicians, such as Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, will attempt to balance Baghdad’s relations with Iran and the United States in an effort to avoid Iraq becoming an arena for conflict between the two countries.

Iran is determined to maintain influence in Syria.

• Iran is pursuing a permanent military presence and economic deals in Syria as the conflict winds down there. Tehran almost certainly wants these things to build its regional influence, support Hizballah, and threaten Israel.

Iran will remain a destabilizing force in Yemen, as Tehran’s support to the Huthis—including supplying ballistic and cruise missiles as well as unmanned systems—poses a threat to US partners and interests, notably through strikes on Saudi Arabia.

Tehran remains a threat to Israel, both directly through its missile forces and indirectly through its support of Hizballah and other terrorist groups.

Iran will hedge its bets in Afghanistan, and its actions may threaten instability. Iran publicly backs Afghan peace talks, but it is worried about a long-term US presence in Afghanistan. As a result, Iran is building ties with both the government in Kabul and the Taliban so it can take advantage of any political outcome.

Military Capabilities

Iran’s diverse military capabilities and its hybrid approach to warfare—using both conventional and unconventional capabilities—will continue to pose a threat to US and allied interests in the region for the foreseeable future.

• Iran demonstrated its conventional military strategy, which is primarily based on deterrence and the ability to retaliate against an attacker, with its launch of multiple ballistic missiles against a base housing US forces in Iraq in response to the January 2020 killing of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani. Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the region, and despite Iran’s economic challenges, Tehran will seek to improve and acquire new conventional weaponry.

• Iran’s unconventional warfare operations and network of militant partners and proxies enable Tehran to advance its interests in the region, maintain strategic depth, and provide asymmetric retaliatory options.

• The IRGC-QF and its proxies will remain central to Iran’s military power.

Attacks on US Interests and the Homeland

We assess that Iran remains interested in developing networks inside the United States—an objective it has pursued for more than a decade—but the greatest risk to US persons exists outside the Homeland, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia.

• Iran has threatened to retaliate against US officials for the Soleimani killing in January 2020 and attempted to conduct lethal operations in the United States previously.

• During the past several years, US law enforcement has arrested numerous individuals with connections to Iran as agents of influence or for collecting information on Iranian dissidents in the United States, and Iran’s security forces have been linked to attempted assassination and kidnapping plots in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.

• Iran probably can most readily target US interests in the Middle East and South Asia because it has assets and proxies in the region with access to weapons and explosives.

Nuclear Breakout

We continue to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities that we judge would be necessary to produce a nuclear device. However, following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA agreement in May 2018, Iranian officials have abandoned some of Iran’s commitments and resumed some nuclear activities that exceed the JCPOA limits. If Tehran does not receive sanctions relief, Iranian officials probably will consider options ranging from further enriching uranium up to 60 percent to designing and building a new 40 Megawatt Heavy Water reactor.

• Iran has consistently cast its resumption of nuclear activities as a reversible response to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and messaged that it would return to full compliance if the United States also fulfilled its JCPOA commitments.

Since June 2019, Iran has increased the size and enrichment level of its uranium stockpile beyond JCPOA limits. Since September 2019, Iran has ignored restrictions on advanced centrifuge research and development and restarted uranium enrichment operations at the deeply buried Fordow facility. In January, Iran began to enrich uranium up to 20 percent and started R&D with the stated intent to produce uranium metal for research reactor fuel, and in February, it produced a gram quantities of natural uranium metal in a laboratory experiment.

Cyber, Intelligence, Influence, and Election Interference

Iran’s expertise and willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations make it a significant threat to the security of US and allied networks and data. Iran has the ability to conduct attacks on critical infrastructure, as well as to conduct influence and espionage activities.

• Iran was responsible for multiple cyber attacks between April and July 2020 against Israeli water facilities that caused unspecified short-term effects, according to press reporting.

Iran is increasingly active in using cyberspace to enable influence operations—including aggressive influence operations targeting the US 2020 presidential election—and we expect Tehran to focus on online covert influence, such as spreading disinformation about fake threats or compromised election infrastructure and recirculating anti-US content.

• Iran attempted to influence dynamics around the 2020 US presidential election by sending threatening messages to US voters, and Iranian cyber actors in December 2020 disseminated information about US election officials to try to undermine confidence in the US election.

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U.S. Intelligence Community 2019

Worldwide Threat Assessment
Annual Threat Assessment

Director of National Intelligence




Selected extracts

Iran

GLOBAL THREATS

CYBER

Iran continues to present a cyber espionage and attack threat. Iran uses increasingly sophisticated cyber techniques to conduct espionage; it is also attempting to deploy cyber attack capabilities that would enable attacks against critical infrastructure in the United States and allied countries. Tehran also uses social media platforms to target US and allied audiences, an issue discussed in the Online Influence Operations and Election Interference section of this report.

• Iranian cyber actors are targeting US Government officials, government organizations, and companies to gain intelligence and position themselves for future cyber operations.

• Iran has been preparing for cyber attacks against the United States and our allies. It is capable of causing localized, temporary disruptive effects—such as disrupting a large company’s corporate networks for days to weeks—similar to its data deletion attacks against dozens of Saudi governmental and private-sector networks in late 2016 and early 2017.

ONLINE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND ELECTION INTERFERENCE

Iran, which has used social media campaigns to target audiences in both the United States and allied nations with messages aligned with Iranian interests, will continue to use online influence operations to try to advance its interests.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION

We continue to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device. However, Iranian officials have publicly threatened to reverse some of Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments—and resume nuclear activities that the JCPOA limits—if Iran does not gain the tangible trade and investment benefits it expected from the deal.

• In June 2018, Iranian officials started preparations, allowable under the JCPOA, to expand their capability to manufacture advanced centrifuges.

• Also in June 2018, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) announced its intent to resume producing natural uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and prepare the necessary infrastructure to expand its enrichment capacity within the limits of the JCPOA.

• Iran continues to work with other JCPOA participants—China, the European Union, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—to find ways to salvage economic benefits from it. Iran’s continued implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year.

Iran’s ballistic missile programs, which include the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, continue to pose a threat to countries across the Middle East. Iran’s work on a space launch vehicle (SLV)—including on its Simorgh—shortens the timeline to an ICBM because SLVs and ICBMs use similar technologies.

The United States determined in 2018 that Iran is in noncompliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and we remain concerned that Iran is developing agents intended to incapacitate for offensive purposes and did not declare all of its traditional CW agent capabilities when it ratified the CWC.

TERRORISM

Iran almost certainly will continue to develop and maintain terrorist capabilities as an option to deter or retaliate against its perceived adversaries.

• In mid-2018, Belgium and Germany foiled a probable Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) plot to set off an explosive device at an Iranian opposition group gathering in Paris—an event that included prominent European and US attendees.

REGIONAL THREATS

Iran’s regional ambitions and improved military capabilities almost certainly will threaten US interests in the coming year, driven by Tehran’s perception of increasing US, Saudi, and Israeli hostility, as well as continuing border insecurity, and the influence of hardliners. Iran’s Objectives in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen

We assess that Iran will attempt to translate battlefield gains in Iraq and Syria into long-term political, security, social, and economic influence while continuing to press Saudi Arabia and the UAE by supporting the Huthis in Yemen.

In Iraq, Iran-supported Popular Mobilization Committee-affiliated Shia militias remain the primary threat to US personnel, and we expect that threat to increase as the threat ISIS poses to the militias recedes, Iraqi Government formation concludes, some Iran-backed groups call for the United States to withdraw, and tension between Iran and the United States grows. We continue to watch for signs that the regime might direct its proxies and partners in Iraq to attack US interests.

Iran’s efforts to consolidate its influence in Syria and arm Hizballah have prompted Israeli airstrikes as recently as January 2019 against Iranian positions within Syria and underscore our growing concern about the long-term trajectory of Iranian influence in the region and the risk that conflict will escalate.

• Iran’s retaliatory missile and UAV strikes on ISIS targets in Syria following the attack on an Iranian military parade in Ahvaz in September were most likely intended to send a message to potential adversaries, showing Tehran’s resolve to retaliate when attacked and demonstrating Iran’s improving military capabilities and ability to project force.

• Iran continues to pursue permanent military bases and economic deals in Syria and probably wants to maintain a network of Shia foreign fighters there despite Israeli attacks on Iranian positions in Syria. We assess that Iran seeks to avoid a major armed conflict with Israel. However, Israeli strikes that result in Iranian casualties increase the likelihood of Iranian conventional retaliation against Israel, judging from Syrian-based Iranian forces’ firing of rockets into the Golan Heights in May 2018 following an Israeli attack the previous month on Iranians at Tiyas Airbase in Syria.

In Yemen, Iran’s support to the Huthis, including supplying ballistic missiles, risks escalating the conflict and poses a serious threat to US partners and interests in the region. Iran continues to provide support that enables Huthi attacks against shipping near the Bab el Mandeb Strait and land-based targets deep inside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, using ballistic missiles and UAVs.

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