Worldwide Threat Assessment
Annual Threat Assessment
Director of National Intelligence
Selected extracts
Iran
During the next year Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iran’s various conservative factions, despite some differences and infighting, are expected to maintain control over a
politically stable if economically troubled Iranian state. However, recent public feuding between government factions over President Ahmadi-Nejad’s handling of foreign and domestic policy issues—specifically the nuclear issue and the economy—probably is making it more difficult for Khamenei to avoid taking sides. The political discord probably has intensified as a result of international pressure, and as each side tries to position itself in advance of the Majles elections in March.
• Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani in November called on the government to take the latest sanctions seriously, according to press.
• Ahmadi-Nejad publicly has responded by calling his critics “traitors” and threatened to publicly reveal their identities.
• In December, Rafsanjani publicly attacked Ahmadi-Nejad, likening the President’s economic policies to those of the Shah—an extremely unusual and pointed critique.
• Iran is on its soundest financial footing since the revolution with record high oil export revenue boosting foreign exchange reserves to more than $70 billion. Despite the positive financial outlook, Iran’s economy is plagued by the twin problems of high inflation and unemployment, which are Iranians’ top complaints. Ahmadi-Nejad’s populist policies have reduced unemployment marginally, but at the expense of rising inflation, which his political rivals might try to exploit in the upcoming Majles elections.
Iran remains a threat to regional stability and US interests in the Middle East because of its continued support for violent groups, such as HAMAS and Hizballah, and efforts to undercut pro-Western actors, for example in Lebanon. Tehran’s leadership seeks to preserve Iran’s Islamic revolutionary government, sovereignty, stability, and territorial integrity while expanding Iran’s influence and leadership in the region and the Islamic world.
Iran also is enhancing its ability to project its military power—primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power—with the ultimate goal of dominating the Gulf region and deterring potential adversaries. It seeks a capacity to disrupt Gulf shipping, especially in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus the operations and reinforcement of US forces in the region— potentially intimidating regional allies into withholding support for US policy. Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic and antiship cruise missiles is a key element in its efforts to assert its influence.
Iranian leadership perceptions of a favorable environment are driving its foreign policy to expand Tehran’s influence and leadership in the region and the Islamic world and to undermine US influence, which it perceives as inimical to Iran’s clerical regime. To achieve its regional aims and mitigate threats, Iran seeks to develop a sphere of influence based on diplomatic and economic relations, religious affinities, and shared anti-US sentiments. While Tehran seeks better relationships with Shia populations worldwide, it continues to be especially strident in denying Israel’s right to exist.
Whether courting other governments or Muslim citizens, Iranian leaders seek political allies and economic partners as well as religious converts. Moreover, Tehran probably judges that local surrogates—usually Shia allies or proxies cultivated over many years—can promote Iran’s interests.
In Afghanistan, Iran likely will continue to focus on political activities, reaching out to alternative power centers, and challenging the US-led Coalition. Iranian officials probably will
increase contact with various militias, political oppositionists, and religious leaders in Afghanistan and continue to provide lethal aid to groups and individuals who might be able to influence events in Iran’s favor should the Karzai government falter or turn against Iran. We assess Iran has provided weapons to some Taliban commanders. NATO forces last September interdicted a vehicle convoy from Iran that contained weapons, including advanced improvised explosive devices, destined for the Taliban.
• In the Levant, Iranian security concerns, particularly vis-à-vis Israel and the United States, and ambitions to become a dominant regional player, loyalty to allies, and concern for Lebanese Shia probably are driving Tehran’s relations with Syria, Hizballah, and other regional groups. Over the longer term, differences in Iranian and Syrian goals could limit their cooperation, but—barring significant changes in threat perceptions by either Syria or Iran—Tehran probably will continue providing military support to Syria.
• In Lebanon, Tehran seeks to build Iran’s and Hizballah’s influence to the detriment of other Lebanese communities and US and Israeli interests. To enhance its role as the leader of resistance to Israel, Iran will increase its support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including HAMAS.
IRAN’S AND NORTH KOREA’S WMD AND MISSILE PROGRAMS
The Iranian and North Korean regimes flout UN Security Council restrictions on their nuclear programs.
Over the past year we have gained important new insights into Tehran’s activities related to nuclear weapons and the Community recently published a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian intent and capabilities in this area. I want to be very clear in addressing the Iranian nuclear capability. First, there are three parts to an effective nuclear weapons capability:
1. Production of fissile material
2. Effective means for weapons delivery
3. Design and weaponization of the warhead itself
We assess in our recent NIE on this subject that warhead design and weaponization were halted, along with covert military uranium conversion- and enrichment-related activities. Declared uranium enrichment efforts, which will enable the production of fissile material, continue. This is the most difficult challenge in nuclear production. Iran’s efforts to perfect ballistic missiles that can reach North Africa and Europe also continue.
We remain concerned about Iran’s intentions and assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We have high confidence that Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons until fall 2003. Also, Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons. Iran continues its efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology, which can be used both for power reactor fuel and to produce nuclear weapons. And, as noted, Iran continues to deploy ballistic missiles inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and to develop longer range missiles. We also assess with high confidence that even after fall 2003 Iran has conducted research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, as well as its covert military uranium conversion and enrichment related activities, for at least several years. Because of intelligence gaps, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that all such activities were halted. We assess with moderate confidence that Tehran had not restarted these activities as of mid-2007, but since they comprised an unannounced secret effort that Iran attempted to hide, we do not know if these activities have been restarted.
We judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. This indicates that Iran may be more susceptible to influence on the issue than we judged previously.
We do not have sufficient intelligence information to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart those activities. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons and such a decision is inherently reversible. I note again that two activities relevant to a nuclear weapons capability continue: uranium enrichment that will enable the production of fissile material and development of long-range ballistic missile systems.
We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons.
We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge with high confidence it has not yet done.
Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the 2003 halt in its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems. All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
We know that Tehran had a chemical warfare program prior to 1997, when it declared elements of its program. We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce CW agent in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. We assess Iran maintains a capability to weaponize CW agents in a variety of delivery systems.
We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for biological warfare.
